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GEORGE ELIOT, SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM AND LITERARY FORM:
SOME REFLECTIONS ON FELICIA BONAPARTE'S WILL AND DESTINY
By K . M. Newton
Felicia Bonaparte's study of Eliot's fiction , Will and Destiny: Morality and Tragedy in George
Eliot's Novels , was published in 1975. I read it rather quickly towards the end of the 1970s
because at the time I was working on a study of Eliot of my own and inevitably my attention
was somewhat focused on whether there was going to be any overlap with my book. Since
Bonaparte's book argued strongly that Eliot was intellectually committed to empiricism and
scientific rationality and mine attempted to bring out her relation to aspects of Romanticism , I
believed at the time there was little common ground between the two books and I therefore did
not need to engage seriously with it. Having read Will and Destiny more recently with much
fuller attention, it now seems to me a major study of Eliot and that this has not been sufficiently
acknowledged by later critics. Glancing at recommendations for further reading in the many
editions of Eliot's novels that are currently available, Will and Destiny is seldom listed.
Bonaparte's later study, The Tryptych and the Cross , which focuses solely on Romola, has
rightly been widely recognized by critics with a serious interest in that novel as a critical tour
de force. Will and Destiny should also be an essential critical text for readers of Eliot.
What has perhaps led to the comparative neglect of Will and Destiny is that Bonaparte ,
one of the most unashamedly intellectual of Eliot's critics , is so unequivocal in identifying her
with scientific materialism. In the book's Introduction Bonaparte writes:
It was largely the empiricists, who themselves saw the need for some moral authority,
who attempted to build a new system out of the new truths , who argued that science was
not a threat to morality but a new and stronger foundation for what must become modem
ethics. Eliot too was an empiricist. She too believed that science must be the basis of the
morality of the future . And , like John Stuart Mill and August Comte, she found in science
the answer to both relativism and scepticism. For it was science, Eliot held , not God that
provided an inflexible authority for moral law. '

Discussing passages from Daniel Deronda and The Mill on the Floss she writes :
Two points are of particular importance in these passages . First, the appeal to science habitual in all of Eliot's writings - is not merely an explanatory analogy. It is a substantial
commitment through which Eliot places man [ ... J in the natural order of the universe and
so asserts the fundamentally material view of man she shared with such ' scientific '
thinkers as Mill , Comte, Marx, and others. Secondly, both passages accept scientific
methodology in that they probe for a principle which will not only explicate the behavior
revealed in empirical data but will enable the scientist (cosmic or human) to know and
predict, by 'strict deduction ', that which must of necessity remain beyond observation . It
is a view, clearly, which adheres most precisely to the evidence of matter and the concept
of law. (p 50)

Though this kind of discourse is likely to have alienated many critics and may have played a
part in Will and Destiny not finding its way onto many reading lists of Eliot criticism , one
recent critic has sided with Bonaparte's critical perspective. Avrom Fleishman in his book
George Eliot's Intellectual Life supports Bonaparte in arguing that Mill is Eliot's major
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intellectual influence and claims that Bonaparte is Eliot's best critic. What cannot be denied
about Bonaparte on Eliot is that she applies a fonnidable intelligence to her reading of the
novels . Much of the book considers in detail particular episodes and characters from the novels
in highly persuasive readings. Perhaps Fleishman should look again at Will and Destiny since
his generally negative comments on Adam Bede - 'One cannot regard Adam Bede as a major
work of fiction, but it establishes a solid foundation for a great career " - receives little support
from Bonaparte who devotes a good deal of space to it and clearly sees it as one of Eliot's
major works. When Bonaparte focuses on particular novels in detail, though her intellectual
perspective is clear, she does not reduce the novels to romans Cl these and even characters who
critics generally tend to think are not complex enough to deserve detailed critical analysis such
as Arthur Donnithorne or Fred Vincy are discussed in illuminating tenns, Bonaparte powerfully
demonstrating how Eliot combines intellectual critique with sympathetic understanding .
Claiming that Eliot writes from the point of view of scientific materialism is of course
open to the objection that currents of thought that on the surface do not seem easily
reconcilable with it can also be found in her writings, such as her admiration for Words worth
and for aspects at least of the thought of such figures as Carlyle and Ruskin, as well as her
interest in Judaism, Jewish mysticism and in religion generally. Bonaparte does not ignore this,
Wordsworth is mentioned as well as the emphasis Eliot places on 'mystery' in some of her
references to science, though Bonaparte claims that this does not mean that her commitment to
empiricism and the scientific project is seriously undermined. However, this raises the question
as to whether Eliot's intellectual perspective is coherent or whether she has an innovative
intellectual position that is able to integrate apparently opposed elements, and here Bonaparte's
discussion may fail to convince .
One might consider Eliot's relation to detenninism in this context. Bonaparte argues
that Eliot is fully committed to determinism and entitles one of the sections of her chapter on
'Destiny', 'Undeviating Law in the Material and Moral World', claiming that it is assumed in
Eliot's fiction that the 'cosmic scheme [is] governed only by causal laws ' (p. 21). She quotes a
letter from Eliot to Charles Bray regarding his book, The Philosophy of Necessity , in which she
agrees with Bray on determinism - 'mind presents itself under the same condition of
invariableness of antecedent and consequent as all other phenomena' - but one should note that
she adds a qualification : 'the only difference being that the true antecedent and consequent are
proportionately difficult to discover as the phenomena are more complex' (p. 48). What Eliot's
fiction surely shows is that in the human realm at least all phenomena are complex so that there
is almost never any simple relation between cause and effect, and even in science where the
testing of hypotheses is done under carefully controlled experimental conditions there is
always scope for misinterpretation. Bonaparte is not unaware of this complexity and quotes the
following passage from Chapter 6 of Middlemarch:
Even with a microscope directed on a water-drop we find ourselves making
interpretations which turn out to be rather coarse; for whereas under a weak lens you may
seem to see a creature exhibiting an active voracity into which other smaller creatures
actively play as if they were so many animated tax-pennies, a stronger lens reveals to you
certain tiniest hairJets which make vortices for these victims while the swallower waits
passively at his receipt of custom. (pp. 7-8)

By implication an even more powerful microscope may make the second interpretation of the
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water-drop equally coarse , requmng a different metaphor to help comprehend the new
interpretation . Bonaparte also admits the epistemological limitation of empiricism - 'all
empirical observation, including science , can never be known to be knowledge of what is but
only of what is perceived', so that 'Eliot's realism becomes, of necessity, an attempt at
objectivity that remains within the limits of subjectivity' (p. 11) .
Bonaparte admits, then, that 'Eliot's determinism [ ... ] carries considerably more
complex implications than are suggested by a position such as Bray's [in his Philosophy of
Necessity]' (p. 50), and she goes on to make an important distinction between actions 'which
arise in [a character 's] very essence' and those which arise 'only in [a character's] attributive
nature' (p. 53), the first being qualitatively different from the second. She also claims that for
Eliot all events considered in empirical terms are equal: ' Not only does every apparent minute
detail of action acquire special meaning in Eliot, but, more significantly, it is impossible to tell,
a priori , which event will be more important than another ' (pp . 53-4) . It follows that though a
character's 'very essence' may shape action, when a character encounters the randomness of
events one cannot predict with any certainty how that character will act when 'attributive
nature' comes into play, since in the situation the character is presented with there will always
be scope for variability of response in terms of action. Bonaparte does not make this point
explicitly but it is illustrated powerfully in her discussion ofTito Melema's response in Romola
to Baldassarre's suddenly confronting him in Florence: 'The surprise of seeing Baldassarre for
the first time and the fact that the meeting takes place in public allow Tito no opportunity to
calculate consequences. When Lorenzo asks who the strange man might be, Tito replies
instantly, "Some madman, surely'" (p .153). As Bonaparte points out, Tito later believes it
would have been less of a risk to have recognized Baldassarre: 'Events prove his second
thoughts right' (p.l54) . Yet is she right in implying that if Tito had had more time to reflect he
could have calculated the consequences correctly and so would have behaved differently? I
think this is where her determinism oversimplifies the situation. Determinism can be no
reliable guide to future circumstances since there are too many variables. At the point
Baldassarre confronts him , Tito cannot know what action would serve his interests best. To use
Bonaparte's terminology, Tito 's ' very essence' is his devotion to self-interest and his own
pleasure but that cannot determine how, in terms of his 'attributive nature', he should act in
specific situations as events arise unpredictably and he has to decide how to act without
knowing whether the consequences of a particular action will serve his interests better than an
alternative action . Before he acts he has the power to shape reality in different ways but once
he has acted, a reality is created that is now unalterable. This is a point that Bonaparte rightly
stresses: 'in a character's intentions [ ... ] we see perhaps subtler, truer motives. Yet the events
of the novels arise in actions, not in intentions , a fact which many readers find disagreeable in
Eliot [ .. .]. It is [ .. .] the very core of her convictions that intentions and motives , like hopes and
wishes , have no consequences , do not, cannot, have consequences ' (p. 34).
Every person performs actions that could have been different, given that there is always
the potential for some degree of variability of response in regard to action in any situation. The
action that is performed will have consequences, and these consequences will create other
situations in which variability of response comes into play before another action takes place,
and so on ad infinitum. Such complexity makes determinism of limited value for Eliot in
understanding the effect of actions at the human level whatever its value in the realm of science
where great effort is made to control variability. This does not mean that determinism has no
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significant role in Eliot's fiction but her novels habitually show that in the human context the
consequences of an action generally cannot be determined by a single cause, the corollary of
which is that one cannot predict with any certainty that any action or decision will necessarily
result in a particular set of consequences. In Romola Tito's action in refusing to recognize
Baldassarre does not inevitably lead to his ruin - numerous other factors play a part - but if he
had chosen to seek reconciliation with Baldassarre this would have contributed to creating an
alternative reality to the one in which he ends up being murdered by Baldassarre. An example
of there being a determining cause of a character's ruin which is not sufficient in itself to
account for that ruin is Lydgate's vote for Tyke in Middlemarch. This links him to Bulstrode in
people's minds, a link that is crucial in his being implicated in the death of Raffles . Yet a whole
network of causes and consequences have to be taken into account in addition to Lydgate's vote
for Tyke in order to lead eventually to the accusations that end his career in Middlemarch and
the hospital project. Among the most obvious are the blackmailing of Bulstrode by Raffles,
Lydgate's arrogance which alienates influential people, the prejudices and fears of other
doctors who have a motive for believing anything that would result in his leaving
Middlemarch, his marriage to Rosamond Vincy which places him seriously in debt so that he
is eventually forced to seek financial support from Bulstrode, and one could list many
seemingly less obvious factors that play a part in his ruin. The novel may give special emphasis
to the vote for Tyke as the apparent origin of his ultimate failure but that emphasis does not
imply that this event had more intrinsic importance than other events or actions that also
contribute to his failure - so Bonaparte is right that 'it is impossible to tell, a priori, which
event will be more important than another' - but it is inevitable that human beings will see
certain events as more important and significant than others in relation to their interests, beliefs,
or prejudices. The narrative the narrator creates is influenced by interests and a philosophical
perspective that shape its construction. A complex structure of events is created in relation to
Lydgate's failure, one which gives special emphasis to his vote for Tyke, and though there is
no direct and simple link between that action and Lydgate's failure, one can infer from the
narrator's highlighting of the vote for Tyke that a different reality would have emerged if he
had not voted for Tyke, one in which he may not have been implicated in Raffles's death and
in which he may not have had to leave Middlemarch.
The interpretation of reality that is embodied in the narrative is of course interesting in
itself and particularly relevant to the ethical and political themes of Middlemarch but there is
an implied subtext that suggests there is an infmity of potential realities, a subtext that
undermines conventional positivist empiricism with its emphasis on causality and
consequence. If there is a weakness in Bonaparte's treatment of determinism it is that cause and
consequence are not sufficiently subject to scrutiny - she argues that 'characters who commit
their fortunes to chance [... ] ignore [ ... ] the factual world in which events occur only within
the scope of cause and consequence' (p. 16) - but not sufficient account is taken of variability
of response always being theoretically present before any action takes place, with
consequences not being able to be reliably calculated. There is thus always some degree of
gambling intrinsic in any action in relation to its intended effect. In discussing the role of
chance in Eliot, Bonaparte writes that there is an 'assumption [ ... ] that Eliot could trace, had
she fictional world enough and time, a long chain of causes and effects which would make
these events in question [chance events] as naturally inevitable as others in the novels' (p. 41).
I think, however, Eliot would consider that a futile exercise since multiple causes and effects
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will produce a web (to use Eliot's most famous metaphor) of such infinite complexity that
understanding the totality of relations between causes and effects is beyond human
comprehension. Chance is thus an ineradicable human concept and gambling an inevitability,
and though her narrator may express moral disapproval of gambling as a life strategy, it is also
clear that gamblers sometimes improbably win.
Does Eliot or more exactly her narrator, however, generally rig things so that a
narrative structure is created in which, for example, characters such as Tito or Grandcourt are
punished by how events turn out? This leads to the question of whether artistic organisation in
Eliot's fiction is at odds with empiricism. One of the most interesting aspects of Bonaparte's
argument in Will and Destiny is that, though she recognizes that for the artist subjectivity
cannot be overcome, she detects discordance between Eliot's scientific materialism and the
methods and techniques she applies to realise her artistic and moral aims as a novelist.
Bonaparte believes Eliot as artist was committed to representing the world in empiricist terms ,
banishing distorting subjectivity as far as possible: 'Precisely because subjectivity threatens
always to question the truth of the artist's vision, experience must be refined and adjusted by
knowledge, itself founded on experience but now reflected on formally and analytically[ ... ].
For there can be no doubt that Eliot was a thorough empiricist [... ] like Mill [... ] arguing
against any criterion of truth whose basis is not in solid fact' (p. 5). Yet Bonaparte in a section
of her chapter on 'Destiny' , entitled 'Loose Threads in the Causal Web', believes Eliot's
empiricism is compromised in her fiction and she attributes that to Eliot's need to employ
artistic methods to incorporate her moral perspective within the narrative.
It seems odd that, though Bonaparte refers to Hume in relation to Eliot - 'Gordon
Haight dismisses far too lightly [... ] the insight that George Eliot's novels "seem to have been
dictated to a plain woman of genius by the ghost of David Hume'" (p. 5) - that she appears not
to take account of one of Hume's most cited ideas: the unbridgeable dichotomy between fact
and value when she claims 'that science was not a threat to morality but a new and stronger
foundation for what must become modern ethics' (p. xxii). She sees Eliot in her fiction
confronting 'the existential , absurd universe [. .. ] a tragic universe in which man is born and
dies for no purpose and with little hope for joy' (p. viii), and claims that Eliot is right to believe
that empiricism and science can somehow on their own provide the foundation for a morality
that will be independent of religion or metaphysics and can overcome relativism and
scepticism. Despite Eliot's support for science and a methodology based on empiricism,
Bonaparte 's claim that for Eliot they were sufficient in themselves to supply the basis of moral
law is open to doubt. For example, though Eliot accepted the scientific validity of Darwinian
theory, she rejected the claim that its governing principle, 'survival of the fittest', in Spencer's
formulation, could provide the basis for ethical action at the individual or social level.
Bonaparte is critical of aspects of Eliot's fiction that cannot be reconciled with
empiricism: 'There are elements of melodrama which cannot be satisfactorily explained [ ... ]
especially in the matter of causality. Why Eliot devised these and thought them - as she must
have - appropriate, or at least not inappropriate, must make a list of futile guesses' (p. 42). In
'Loose Threads in the Causal Web ' , Bonaparte argues that it is artistic pressures that lead to the
setting aside of empiricism since the artistic organization of her narratives implies there is a
moral order in the world that tends to benefit the morally deserving and generally, if not
always, punishes or frustrates the undeserving . For Bonaparte this is not reconcilable with
scientific materialism, since a 'deus ex machina' appears to intrude into 'the plots of events'
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and so that there is 'a striking contradiction to Eliot's fundamental principle of action' (p. 36) .
Daniel Deronda is particularly problematic in this respect:
In Deronda especially, Eliot seems to go beyond the possible and the probable. Here, the
reader is troubled by many questions . Why, for instance , is it Daniel who happens to find
Mirah as she is about to commit suicide, an incident which leads him to the preparation
of his own long-delayed destiny? Why does it happen that Mordecai is Mirah 's brother?
Why is it that Ezra Cohen, whom Daniel believes to be Mirah's brother, is not but
happens to employ the man who is? (pp. 36-7)

Bonaparte is inclined to be forgiving of Eliot for this use of 'coincidences' but sees the problem
as lying with literary form which Eliot as an artist inevitably employs , so that Grandcourt's
drowning 'at so appropriate a moment' is a 'coincidence' , but one foreshadowed in the text.
Though Bonaparte understands why Eliot as a novelist might not want to abandon such a
crucial literary device even if it is in contradiction with an empirical view of reality, the
discordance between her philosophical commitment and her artistic practice needs to be
acknowledged: 'foreshadowing is an aesthetic device which can hardly expect to find
realization in the real world which Eliot's fiction promises to mirror. The reader 's doubt
persists ' (pp . 37-8) .
Another reason Bonaparte cites to account for events like the drowning of Grandcourt
that she finds inappropriate in terms of empiricism is that they are 'thematically motivated' (p.
38) and she points out that sometimes symbolism also appears to be necessary: 'Yet even such
deflections from literal fact do not offer Eliot all the scope she sometimes requires. Very often
we find Eliot compelled - or thinking she is compelled , which yields an identical consequence
- to communicate not only on the literal level but on one or more symbolic levels ' (pp . 38-9).
In Si/as Mamer , she argues , there are two levels which must be kept apart, 'the factually
realistic and the mythically true level; and each demands a different set of rules . It is essential
not to take the myth for the fact' (p. 39). But this creates incoherence: 'one of the novel's major
theses concerns the causal relationship itself, demonstrated on the literal level by the events
which occur mainly in Godfrey Cass's life, but demonstrated on the mythical level in symbols
which , if taken literally, deny the very hypotheses they are designed to enforce' (p . 39) .
Bonaparte goes on to argue that it is understandable that 'more and more, Eliot turned to the
refuge of symbolic endings' (p. 41), since endings can have no empirical justification in reality:
' the world continues [ .. .] in pretty much the way it had before' (p . 41).
Other critics have raised the same problem in relation to Eliot and her plots but none
has articulated it as powerfully as Bonaparte, together with an attempt to understand why it
exists rather than simply to accuse Eliot of failing to resolve a contradiction: 'In plot, she never
found a structure that suitably expressed her very unique vision at all points . Thus the content
of Eliot's novels is often revolutionary, modem, the form, not always ' (pp. 42-3) . It is hard to
believe, however, that Eliot would not have been aware of this apparent mismatch between
literary form and empirical content and not have attempted to overcome it. Otherwise one
might have to resist Bonaparte's claim that Eliot writes from the point of view of a scientific
materialist, or alternatively that Bonaparte's understanding of the form of her novels and its
relation to the empirical is based on questionable assumptions. Some Eliot critics may prefer
to take the former view since it allows them to set aside Bonaparte's claim that Eliot was a
' thorough empiricist' and thus open up her fiction to alternative readings. But though as I
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suggested previously a great range of ideas circulate in Eliot's texts I think Bonaparte is right
to see empiricism as central to Eliot's realism and I will therefore argue that she misreads the
form of Eliot's fiction .
Bonaparte makes what may seem an unexceptionable point: 'Eliot makes a clear
distinction between what is true and what is literal. In cases such as the drowning of
Grandcourt, it seems fairly obvious that the literal recorder of facts must be in conflict with the
analytic commentator on them' (p. 38). I quoted previously Bonaparte's comment: 'Eliot's
realism becomes, of necessity, an attempt at objectivity that remains within the limits of
subjectivity' (p. 11), drawing obviously on Kant, but the conflict Bonaparte sees between the
'literal facts' the narrator records and the subjectivity of the narrator is problematic. This is to
treat Eliot's form of narration as essentially similar to third person narration in conventional
fiction where the 'literal facts' are assumed to exist separately from the narrator who merely
describes them or comments on them. But if 'objectivity [ ... ] remains within the limits of
subjectivity' such a separation is called into question, and I shall argue that the form of Eliot's
narration undermines such a separation . Her narrator is characterized as a historical novelist
writing about events that have already happened and that are real for the narrator. A narrative
structure is formed out of such events with the narrator using the techniques available to a
novelist in shaping and commenting on them . Reality is still made up of 'literal facts ' but by
being mediated through the mind of the narrator as novelist who has certain interests ,
particularly ethical and political in nature , reality is a fusion of the objective and the subjective.
Though 'literal facts ' have an independent existence, they are accessed via the subjectivity of
the narrator. Nor do Eliot's narrators pretend they are neutral observers or describers of an
independent reality made up of 'literal facts'; their subjectivity is on display through numerous
interventions and expressions of opinion . The narrators interpret the events, situations and
people they are concerned with not only as conventional historians but also as novelists, their
interpretations exploiting the devices of fiction , such as foreshadowing , a 'thematically
motivated' connecting of events, use of symbolism in order to go beyond 'literal facts' and
communicate at a different level which generates a range of possible meanings . Though the
narrative may consist of 'literal facts' and descriptive detail , these are integrated into a literary
form which incorporates a commentary that may be ironical, sceptical, pessimistic, idealistic,
so that the reality that is represented is complex and multi-faceted. Thus description ,
interpretation, critical comment, along with the appeal to the senses that is associated with
artistic form and expression, constantly interact. To refer as Bonaparte does to the
'unlikelihood of some events' is to read a novel like Deronda as if 'literal facts' and empirical
events exist independently and not within a narrative shaped by the narrator. There is no 'deus
ex machina' who 'intrudes into "the plots of events'" but only a narrator as novelist who shapes
events to serve both a thematic and an aesthetic purpose; it is no 'coincidence' that drowning
recurs in the text of Deronda, with Grandcourt's drowning being 'foreshadowed ' ; this linking
is created by the narrator as novelist and artist. 'Factual' events such as the drowning
nevertheless retain their empirical independence and are thus open to being interpreted
differently.
Of course this implies that the narrator should not be identified with Eliot as author, a
standard assumption by many previous critics . Her novels rather have 'implied authors' with
the narrator being within the narrative and a major structural element of it. The implied author
functions as a frame which surrounds the narrative though not of course intended to be
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specifically present in the text, in effect functioning as what Jacques Derrida calls a 'parergon' , 3
incidentally a word Eliot uses in the plural in Chapter 29 of Middlemarch. I would argue that
this gives the reader some scope to interpret things differently from the narrator while still
respecting the narrator's point of view. Narrators can also enter the minds of characters
seemingly independently of the narrator through the literary technique of free indirect speech,
though there is no metaphysical but only imaginative penetration. I believe this analysis
overcomes the contradiction Bonaparte sees as an inevitable consequence of the disjunction
between Eliot's empiricism and the morally motivated structuring of reality implied by the
novelistic methods and techniques she employs, nor is there any indication that empirical
events have an intrinsic meaning or a moral structure in themselves. Though Bonaparte
recognizes that realism can never be purely and objectively empiricist since subjectivity cannot
be completely eliminated, she does not draw the same conclusion that Eliot, I believe, draws
from it, that art can combine realism grounded in empiricism with an ethical dimension
mediated through art even if empiricism is ethically neutral or indifferent. By being committed
both to empiricism and to art, I would suggest that Eliot believes the realist novel in her
conception of it has the potential to exploit its literary and artistic power to overcome Hume's
dichotomy between fact and value, or empiricism and the ethical.
In the last chapter of Will and Destiny, 'Morality and Tragedy', Bonaparte ties to find
a way of overcoming the problem that Eliot's ethical aims in her fiction seem to require that
empiricism be set aside and improbabilities and 'coincidences' be resorted to. She claims that
integration can be seen to work in practice if one regards the narration as consisting in effect
of two narrators or '[t]wo narrative voices' who exist 'in an irresolvable tension' (p. 182) with
each other: 'There is, first, an analytic narrator who explicates, with neutral accuracy, the facts
of existence [ ... ]. He is nonpartisan [... ] objective [... ] outside the experience of the characters
[... ] uninvolved', thus viewing reality purely empirically. 'The second narrator, quite different
in tone, is subjective [... ] because he enters fully into the exjstence of every character' (p. 163),
thus creating the sympathetic consciousness that is intrinsic to the moral dimension of Eliot's
fiction. The second narrator 'knows with that knowledge that comes from total identification,
the final and unquestionable validity of the egocentric view [... ] he justifies the self against all
encroachments [... ]. But against the objective and analytic narrator, whose exclusive right it is
to record the movement of destiny, the subjective narrator is as powerless as the characters
themselves against the pressure of compelling facts' (pp. 163-4). While the analytic narrator is
ruthlessly objective about human beings blind to the reality of the human situation, the
subjective narrator urges sympathy even if they may have few redeeming features, as is evident
in the following passage Bonaparte quotes from Chapter 17 of Adam Bede:
everyone, must be accepted as they are; you can neither straighten their noses, nor
brighten their wit, nor rectify their dispositions; and it is these people - amongst whom
your life is passed - that it is needful you should tolerate, pity, and love; it is these more
or less ugly, stupid, inconsistent people, whose movements of goodness you should
admire - for whom you should cherish all possible hopes, all possible patience. (171)

But Bonaparte's creation of two narrative voices is only an expedient to try to overcome the
fact that in reality there is only one narrator who is equally committed both to empiricism with
its basis in rationality and objectivity, and to a form of ethics with its basis in sympathy. Such
sympathy has no credibility and becomes sentimentality if it ignores the perspective of the
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analytic narrator, but the division of the narrator into two voices is a consequence of
Bonaparte's misreading of the form of Eliot's novels , as I have tried to argue. However, this
misreading does not prevent many insightful readings by Bonaparte of particular characters
and situations, which are as evident in the final chapter of the study as in earlier ones. These
readings together with the fact that Bonaparte raises theoretical questions in relation to Eliot
that still need to be engaged with makes Will and Destiny necessary reading for any serious
student of her fiction.
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